

DANCE AND EMBODIMENT

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This article will examine dance from the overall standpoint of embodiment, of man's existence as a body in the world. Man's embodied being in the world has been the subject of particular interest in phenomenological philosophy. The phenomenology of dance will be dealt with along these lines.

Dance is a unique art form precisely because the dancer attempts to express something solely through the motion of his body. Paul Valéry has stated that dance is "nothing more and nothing less than the action of the entire human body".¹ Naturally, the dancer can use devices, costumes or sets in order to impart his message, but a work of art must be based on the expressive power of bodily motion in order to be called dance. This bodily motion may be bound to some classical or modern language of motion, or it may create its own language of motion. At any rate, what is essential is that the dancer try, through his bodily movements and posture, to express something that we might call the message of dance.

When we talk about dance, the point of departure is usually a dance tradition such as classical ballet, modern dance, etc. Any exchange, therefore, often gets "stuck" in the specific tradition under discussion. From the standpoint of a philosophical analysis of dance, such an approach is inadequate. It is a position that in itself requires philosophical analysis.

The basic level from which different dance traditions can be derived is human embodiment. As Paul Valéry expressed this conception, "every epoch that has understood the human body and experienced at least some sense of its mystery, its resources, its limits, its combinations of energy and sensibility, has cultivated and revered the dance".²

From my point of view, man's existence in the world as a body with expressive power is the best point of departure for any philosophy of dance. Dance is not possible without the body. To understand dance as a phenomenon, we must first understand the corporeality of human existence. From a general analysis of embodiment, we can then proceed to an examination of the expressiveness of the body, where dance also has its place.

Any practice which improves the body's expressive capabilities or enables it to learn a new language of motion reflects, on a more general philosophical level, the concept that man is somehow an ongoing project. Being a project entails a continuous orientation towards the future and its possibilities.³

Thus, with an eye on the future, the dancer also exercises his body with the purpose in mind of expanding his possibilities. On a more general level, exercising the body is connected to how we understand the meaning of our movement. Those who exercise

regularly conceive of the meaning of their exercise in many different ways. The end goals of training may vary. That a certain form of motion is called art, does not offer an adequate starting point in a philosophical sense for comprehending the manner of being of dance. In any given situation, what we call art is time-specific, while the philosophical point of view is more comprehensive.

Exercise is the means to four key projects. I designate these projects as follows: *Winning, Health, Expression and Self*. Winning refers to those forms of exercise such as competitive sports with victory as a goal. When exercise is the means to a stronger and healthier body, health is the project, as in fitness training. Exercise as a key to self includes all forms of motion that involve the study of self, with the goal of discovering what can be termed actual or authentic existence. The last concept is based on the writings of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Projects of self include, for example, yoga, the various Asian self-defense disciplines and tai-chi.

In this general overview of corporeal projects, dance could be considered a project of expression. Dance does not differ from other projects because of its artfulness; some dance forms clearly lack artistic aspirations. For example, sacred dance is clearly a project of self. On the other hand, it is possible to see artistic elements in the project of winning. Naturally, we can isolate the dance form that aspires to be art and define it as such.

The Body as the Center of Being in the World

Like many other phenomenologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a French philosopher, takes "being in the world" as the basis of his philosophy when he asks the following: What is it that is in the world? Merleau-Ponty answers his own question: it is our body, the lived and conscious body that opens the world to us. It is simultaneously both the means and the center of our existence. Bodily, we are tied to the world both in time and in space. Bodily, we always exist here and now. Merleau-Ponty calls this our situation. He writes: "The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be enmeshed in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and to be continually committed to them."⁴ For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the center of the world "towards which all objects turn their face".⁵ As he sees it, the body is also the center of the world in the sense that "I know that objects have many facades because I can walk around them and study them. In this light, I am conscious of the world through my body."⁶

The following example illustrates Merleau-Ponty's ideas. Let's imagine consciousness without a body, an angel, for example. How can an angel be conscious of the world? This question, of course, has difficult theological implications, which I will ignore for the moment. My assumption is that angels have no body and therefore no sense organs; no eyes, nose or ears. How could such a being perceive the world? It can't, because it lacks the instruments of perception. If an angel doesn't have a dimensional body, it can't walk around objects, study them and take note that they are dimensional, too. To experience what it feels like to dance, it would have to create for itself a living body.

Bodily presence in a place is not the same as an object taking up a certain space. Space experience is always different from objective space. "Being here" as a body does not refer to any external coordinates, relative to which I am here. The body itself sets the first coordinates and determines its own situation. The spatiality of the body is the spatiality of the situation, and not the spatiality of the place.⁷

As a body, I do not exist in the world in the same way an object does; I create my own world. So, embodiment is connected with two levels of space, objective space and space experienced. Any study of movement and its meaning should take both these horizons into consideration. As bodies, we are not merely objects among other objects; we are part of the world as a whole. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the body exists in the world like the heart in an organism. In a way, the body breathes life into the internal play that is the world we experience.⁸

Merleau-Ponty calls the body the natural subject⁹ or the natural ego¹⁰, precisely because the body is the center of our perceptions. This being the case, we do not perceive with the help of our body but intrinsically in our body, since our body is the subject of our perceptions.¹¹

The terms of "body as object" and "lived body" refer to the two levels of our being mentioned above: our body as a thing or an object and our body as we perceive it in the context of our own experience. The body as object has a certain structure made up of bone-scaffolding, muscles, circulation, etc. Anatomy and physiology deal with this aspect of the body. Looking at each other or ourselves (to the extent that we see ourselves) we see the body as object. An autopsy reveals the internal aspect of the body as object.

We experience our own bodies differently. We do not experience our bone-structure or blood circulation. We do not experience our body as an object. Our body is not an object; rather, through our body, objects exist.¹²

We should note immediately that it is possible, of course, to objectify one's own body. This quite often happens in physical exercise. It is also possible to look at someone else's body as an object. This approach is again quite common in physical exercise. In both instances, we lose touch with the experience of the lived body.¹³ For example, to train like a machine with the goal of constantly improving performance or to force the body to fit an externally-determined mold is to objectify one's body. When someone else's body is seen as an obstacle to be conquered, it is then objectified.

The Body's Intentionality

While the body is the center of our being in the world, it also has the potential for "transcending itself". We do not live encapsulated in the world, closed up in ourselves and disconnected. As a body (and as consciousness) our relationship to the world is ongoing. As a living and sensing body, we are even constantly in touch with the prelingual, the basis of everything lingual. This relationship is the intentionality of our "natural subject",

i.e., of our body. Intentionality simply means being in a relationship. This relationship is the basis of all expression, dance included.

According to Merleau-Ponty, every movement is inseparably "movement and consciousness of movement".¹⁴ Movement and our motility are part of our basic intentionality, our basic relationship to the world. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is characterized by action rather than thought. As he writes "in origin, consciousness is not 'I think that' but 'I can'".¹⁵ Consciousness is intentional because it is always in relationship to something. For example, love or hate always has an object. Similarly, the body, too, is intentional because both in its perceptions and its movements, it is always in a relationship to the world.

When I speak of dance as a project of expression, my point of departure is that the essence of the form of movement connected to this project, its most essential way of being, is expression. The dancer's movement is an attempt to express, to communicate something to the audience. This situation may be seen in the light of bodily intentionality; that is, in light of a body that is always in relationship to something. When we speak of expression as the project, the relationship is expression. What exists is the dancer's body, whose primary intentionality in this situation is expression. This intentional relationship may be analyzed more deeply on the basis of its objects, i.e., on the basis of what is expressed. The objects may be emotional (love, hate, jealousy), declarative ("that man is a swindler"), volitional ("I want to kill him"), ethical ("destroying nature is wrong") or aesthetic (in the sense of oneness with nature, for example). The most fundamental intentionality of the dancer's body, his "natural subject", is his relationship to the whole world and, in particular, his own situation. The world is the background for movement. The specific part of this world, the situation, which for the dancer is a certain stage, certain audience, and certain fellow dancers, set the factual limits on the realization of his expressive intentions. The situation cannot limit the nature of his intentional objects, what he tries to express. It may, however, limit the modes of moving he can utilize to reveal these objects. Thus it is quite common for a certain dance to be planned for a specific environment. The situation is not merely a limitation; it also opens the potential for exposing expressional intentions. As a situation for dancers, a forest, for instance, presents possibilities for the language of motion which differ from those on a stage.

We could analyze the dancer's intentional relationship to the world on different levels and thus disclose the various dimensions of his experience. In this way, we could reveal the experiential levels that constitute the dancer's experience in the dance. The point of departure is the dancer's basic intentionality: "the dancer-world relationship", primarily a dialogic relationship between the dancer's body and the world. While this level is a dimension that can be analyzed in components, my intention is to examine just one aspect of the issue.

We could take the dance environment as an example of the dancer-world relationship. The environment might be a stage, or it might be a railway station. The varying projects of expression and forms of dance present different situations and factual environments. Classical ballet, for instance, is very much tied to a stage environment, whereas African dancing can take place virtually anywhere. We could ask how a different environment affects the dialogue between the dancer's body and the world. The facts of the dance situation also determine, as the other part of the dialogue between the dancer and the

world, the language of movement of the dance. Dancing outdoors, for instance, the dialogue might involve a growing tree, a lawn, a market place, a building or sunlight; such elements can only be represented onstage in symbolic form, using props. For both the dancer and the spectator, dancing with a real tree is certainly a different experience than dancing with a stage prop.

The world and the illusion of the world represent different kinds of factuality. In its own way, this factuality in the dancer's situation also sets up the openness where the intentional object of the dancer's expression can move. In other words, on the stage and in artificial light, the dancer cannot express his relationship to sunlight the same way he can in the open air. We might say that the factual "openness" of the dance environment also broadens the expressive possibilities of the dance.

When dancing, the dancer is in a relationship with the world. He also is in a relationship with what he dances, with what, if anything, he wants his dance to communicate, and with how he dances, i.e., with the means and language of movement he uses to achieve his ends. So, the second dimension is "the dancer's relationship as a bodily subject with the idea" that is the intention of his dance. Harmonizing the movement of dance and its intentional object is usually done within the framework of a traditional language of motion: classical ballet and African dance, for instance, depict the emotion of love in very different ways. We could, of course, question how well various traditions succeed and whether one tradition is better than another for expressing a certain intentional object. The richness of dance expression depends on the richness of the language of motion used.¹⁶

Body Temporality

Merleau-Ponty speaks of "the field of the present"¹⁷ as the point of contact between self and time. The present is the point where both past and future horizons open. Merleau-Ponty aptly describes the present as the zone where being and consciousness coincide¹⁸. The body has to exist here and now. In this sense the body can never become the past¹⁹. In a very tangible way, the body brings the past to the present.

In a way, the body is its past: it carries the past along, "secretly nourishes it, devoting to it part of its strength"²⁰, as Merleau-Ponty poetically puts it. This is evident in cases of injury, an amputated arm, for instance. The body bears not only its injuries and scars, but also all bodily memories and skills. We could say that the body brings its skills and traces²¹ to the present. Body skills and traces are essentially permanent, and they can color a person's existence intensively. Riding a bicycle is a good example of a permanent skill: once acquired, the ability is impossible to forget. On the other hand, pain from an injury can also color existence in a significant way, as can an erotic body memory.

Upsetting the body's equilibrium - which is quite common in competitive athletics - often causes permanent traces which a person carries in his body for the rest of his life. This

kind of injury-induced trace creates the spectacles through which the athlete normally views the world. The skills a person acquires have the same function. The dancer's agility, balance and skill bring his past and all his practice to the present, where they manifest themselves as experience. This present includes not only the duration of an actual performance but also everyday life. Dance-related skill colors the dancer's every move.

Horizons of Experience

The French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre has expressed the idea of a body as the past in the sense that whatever we do, including when we perceive, we always in some manner transcend our bodies. Because the body is transcended, the body is the past²². When we handle objects, drive a car or perceive, for instance, when we look out a window, we are seldom conscious of our bodies. We are only conscious of the object and we transcend our body.

Sartre's description is related to activity where the body is not the focus of activity. Such is not the case when our experience is tied to body-consciousness - for instance, in dance. We must clearly separate "ego-consciousness" and "body consciousness" and their respective horizons of experience. A horizon of experience refers to the level or field of experience. The concept is based on the ideas of the German philosopher Max Scheler, who suggests that the way the given existence of the lived body is given is fundamentally different from the given existence of the ego, its states and experiences²³. Scheler refers to these levels of experience as spheres that cannot be reduced to each other²⁴. Our lived body (Leib) opens to us in our body consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "the consciousness of the body involves the entire body, the spirit spreads throughout its parts ...".²⁵

By a "mental-spiritual horizon of experience", I am referring to the level of experience, the background of which is our ego consciousness, and by a "bodily horizon of experience", to the level of experience, the background of which is the body consciousness as described by Scheler.

If we scrutinize our mental-spiritual experience, we see that it can be divided into clearly irreducible levels. Our emotion or volition could be mentioned as examples. These experiences are connected to different experiential levels. However, an emotion such as love, for instance, is not reducible to intellectual experience. We can look at the bodily experience in the same way. Its different levels are, for instance, bodily experiences connected to agility, speed, strength, and tactile sensitivity. These levels may also be called horizons of experience.

My emotional horizon is the total openness of my emotional experiences, which, at the extreme limits, could be expressed by love and hate. Caress and murder represent the extreme limits of my bodily experience horizon connected to tactile sensations.

From the point of view of dance, it would be interesting to contemplate how dance opens

and closes our different horizons of experience.

The Openness of Horizons of Experience And the World's Meanings

All our horizons of experience open the world to us in a specific way. We can talk about the narrowness or openness of horizons of experience. For example, my emotional horizon is closed (narrow, tight) if I can express only a few emotions - for instance, hate - or if I am not capable of externalizing emotions. The horizon is open if I can express a wide range of emotions. If my emotional horizon is closed, or limited, and contains only neutral or hostile feelings, my perceptions of the world and other people will reflect these emotions. Emotional connotations are left closed or only partially open. It would be like looking at the world through a small crack in a fence even though I could open the gate and step inside. If instead, my range of emotions is broader and my emotional horizon is more open, the world in turn appears more open to me, more meaningful. Thus the meanings exposed reveal new opportunities to act and experience the world in a more enriching way.

Similarly, I could take an example from the bodily horizons of experience. The openness or narrowness of bodily horizons of experience depend, however, on specific facts about my body. In other words, how I experience, for example, my strength - as sufficient or insufficient in a given situation - depends on my actual strength, which I can increase through exercises. While such is the case for experiences which are the key to movement - speed, agility, strength, endurance and skill, other bodily experiences, the sense of touch for instance, are not dependent on any special training. The skill acquired through physical exercise as openness of my bodily horizons of experience enables me, for instance, to climb a mountain, thus taking possession of it in a corporeal sense.

If we compare my experience of the mountain with that of someone standing at the foot of the same mountain, the difference is clear. The mountain holds entirely different meanings for the two of us. The mountain, and the world in general, opens in a very concrete sense wider to somebody whose bodily horizons of experience are open - that make this kind of possession possible.

In practicing his body, the dancer may open many of his bodily horizons of experience. I am referring to the kind of practice that awakens his sensitivity to the world rather than exercise which forces his body into an objectified form determined by tradition. He can improve his agility, strength, balance and suppleness. With a body attuned in such a way, the dancer not only improves his capability to express what is required of him, he also at least has the possibility to experience the world in a more sensitive way. As a sensitively tuned body, he is in constant dialogue with his world. In this dialogue he may become an unreserved point of contact to the world, the lightest touch of which may cause a scream. Whether other people hear the scream or not depends on them, on their openness to the world.

As Merleau-Ponty has written, "we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world as

it appears to us insofar as we are in the world through our body, and insofar as we perceive the world with our body."²⁶

We can use the metaphor of a searchlight to describe how the openness or breadth of our horizons of experience reveals the world to us. The beam of a searchlight may be narrow or wide. When the beam lights up the world in darkness, its width, or openness, determines how much of the world we can see. Like a searchlight, man discovers the world with his body by running, dancing, turning his head, touching. In order to know what it feels like to rub his hands together in the crisp morning air, he needs two hands.

The Pre-Objective Body

Until now, I have, in a sense, only used a knife; I have cut the whole field of our experience, i.e., our life world, into pieces, slices. My next objective is to try to put these slices back together into a whole. In order to do this, I will change my perspective. It is possible to examine the bodily experience as a whole, too, thus revealing qualitatively different life worlds. These levels of our experience are also linked to dance. In my opinion, the dancer's experience is also to move in these experiences, to scrutinize them, and to step in and out of them as if they were rooms, even if he himself does not conceptualize his experiences this way.

One point of view is to proceed genetically and examine the birth of our experience of the body and its movement, as well as how this experience differs in developmental stages.

I will start, therefore, at the very beginning with the body of a newborn baby. My argumentation here is based largely on the thoughts of David Michael Levin, the American phenomenologist.²⁷

When man is born into this world, he brings with him certain potential in his genetic code. To start with, his field of motility is open in a number of different directions. The field of motility refers here to the "topology", the grounding where our movements take place. For example, a dancer's field of motility, or topology, is much wider than a runner's field of motility.

Because a newborn baby's movements do not yet contain any ego-logic center, because the ego has not yet been formed, the "motility body" of an infant is experientially still part of the original field of motility, which, using Heidegger's designation, we may call "the being of the Being."²⁸

The Being, the All, the One is given to the infant as a kind of experiential basis, a field of openness to which he belongs himself. This is because an infant does not yet distinguish between subject and object because no subject has formed yet, there is only openness.

I will call this body experiential "The pre-objective body", adapting Merleau-Ponty. It is the body of the newborn, and each and every one of us carries it around inside us as basic

experience, although in most cases, we have forgotten it. It acquires its attunement (Befindlichkeit) in the whole field of being.

The Prepersonal Body, the Body That Plays

The openness of the infant's motility body begins to contract rapidly with the process of socialization, as he becomes a human being. Ego structures form and his original relationship to the being through the pre-objective body starts to fade. His body and his movements conform little by little to the mold and the patterns of movement that are common to all, to "das Man", the subject of the passive, to what everyone is and what nobody really is.

With the concept of "das Man", Heidegger is referring to our everyday manner of being, determined by what others are, what everyone is. Heidegger's concept of inauthentic being refers to the same manner of being.

The openness of moving and body experience that a child starts out with recedes slowly to the background as he acquires certain routines expected by social roles and other cultural factors.²⁹

This change, however, is slow and passes through certain phases. One important phase is the formation of the bodily experience that Levin calls the "prepersonal body" or the "body that plays". In experience, the child is closer to what Merleau-Ponty calls the natural subject; his body, compared to an adult whose subjectivity is ego-logical subjectivity abstracted from the body. The prepersonal body is the body of the child who plays for sake of playing, with no other goal.

This prepersonal body of ours is, according to Levin, "more immediately attuned by, and to the primordial 'clearing' and 'lighting' of Being".³⁰

It is essential that we carry all our bodily experiences with us, even the prepersonal playing body; however, our experiences are so deep within our flesh and behind defenses, so that remembering and reliving them is no longer automatic. As adults, we lose our ability to play. But this need not be. As Levin says, it is possible for the adult, too, to recall this level of bodily experience, the bodily horizon of experience by dropping ones defenses, allowing spontaneous recollection³¹. This often happens in games, when adults, too, have a chance to play.

Ego-Logical Body, the Body of "Das Man"

The next developmental phase of bodily experience is the "ego-logical body", the body of "das Man". This level describes the bodily experience that we as adults know best. It is

our personal body, formed socially and historically and consisting of roles, routines, masks and social habits. It is the body formed by upbringing and other social structures. It may be described as the body of "das Man", "das Man" that everyone is and that no one really is 32.

This is the body that social historians of embodiment 33 study and to which we give new forms, colors and clothing with the changing times. This is the body that visits a tanning salon and sports a punk hairdo, if the fashion of the times requires.

This is the body that follows trends. Physical education and sports in school are important factors in the formation of this body.

That this body of ours is stiff and anxious is the result of our centuries-long Christian upbringing. We were raised in a tradition that regards all bodiliness, any physical pleasure, as low and despicable; the body just gets in the way of spiritual development. The spirit is good and pure, body is bad and dirty. This line of thought is especially clearly manifested in the Christian attitude to sexuality, which in itself is considered fundamentally sinful just like the body. This black-and-white dualism creates the experiential conflicts and anxiety so typical of our times.

Such is not the case in monistic traditions, i.e., traditions which do not strictly separate body and mind, and which consider exercises an important part of man's spiritual aspirations.

So the way we experience our ego-logical body is closely tied to tradition. I am not suggesting that we all experience our ego-logical bodies in the same way. The division into different conceptual bodies that I am positing is my attempt at a phenomenological description which we can use to thematize the levels of our own bodily experiences. In this way we may direct our attention to them and discover the experiential possibilities connected to our movements.

The Transpersonal Body

The next genetic level of our body experience is another concept of Levin's, the "transpersonal body". Levin uses this concept to describe that level of bodily experience where we experience our connectedness to all beings. We experience ourselves as part of nature and its processes. At the same time, we no longer feel ourselves identified with our ego-logical and self-centered body. In religions, we use rituals and ceremonies to bring forth this level of experience 34. This is also the goal of all exercises of self-exploration. These projects of self are always connected to certain systems of religion-philosophy. Sacred dance is a good example of a project of self of this kind.

Transpersonal here means transcending the ego, an experience where ego as a separate and subjective center for experience has been surpassed, an experience that Martin Heidegger describes as an openness to being, an openness to the secret. The experience

has several levels that can be reached by bodily recollection³⁵. I interpret the deepest experience of the transpersonal body as "the recollection of the pre-objective body". In this experience we go back to the basic openness and unity of being, which we have at birth. The body of a playing child is still attuned to this unity, although inevitably in a weakened form; ego structures have already started to form. In any case, the body of a playing child is "closer to its roots", to the unity of being than the adult body, with its fully developed ego-logic has lost. The adult body is, according to Heidegger, uprooted.³⁶ I interpret re-experiencing the body of the playing child, i.e., our pre-personal experience, as the second level of transpersonal body experience. If we could plot our experience on a vertical axis, I would interpret this level of experience as less "deep" than the experience of the pre-objective body. Experiencing the transpersonal body is not regression to previous levels of experience. On the contrary. Levin has described the process in this way: "It is not a question of infantile regression. Nor is it a question of restoring our childhood as it was in the past. The process of thought I am suggesting is, rather, a way of moving forward: integrating into present living a sense of being, and of life's possibilities, from which we have become detached."³⁷

The Recollection of Being

The transpersonal experience of the body can be considered what Heidegger calls recollection of being. I interpreted this above to refer to recollecting the pre-objective experience of body. This experience has already been described as being in connection with being. Heidegger's concept in "Sein und Zeit", is *Wiederholung*, by which he means recollecting man's existential possibilities ³⁸. In inauthentic being, a person does not thematize his possibilities for being, i.e., he does not see his own possibility for authentic existence. Freedom of choice must be discovered first.

What, then, does Heidegger mean when he speaks of unactualized or inauthentic being? For Heidegger, a human being in the world is the openness which gives expression to being, but only to the extent of a person's own openness-to-being. In inauthentic being, a person is actualized in the world by hiding being from view with masks and covers. These covers make it difficult for him to be the light with which being illuminates itself. In inauthenticity, man's self is "das Man selbst", the self, that is defined through others, through the passive subject, through Anybody. Man does then not define his being himself in any genuine sense. Man has then fallen ("verfallen") into the world. In order to become an authentic self, man must free himself from the definitions of the others. In a way, he must return to himself. This is difficult, because the attraction of Anybody is great. Anybody relieves his burden. He does not need to take responsibility for his actions, because he can always refer to Anybody and say, "everybody else does so, too". Being Anybody, man is what everybody is but what nobody really is.

Heidegger says that the discourse (*Rede*) of Anybody, "das Man", is idle talk (*Gerede*); looking is curiosity (*Neugier*); and understanding is ambiguous (*Zweideutigkeit*). In the case of discourse, it is important when speaking to be continuous rather than relevant to the matters at hand. When looking, it is not important to try to understand but merely to

see; it is curiosity that determines what to talk about. This has nothing to do with observation of being, which, according to Heidegger, may astonish so that it transcends all understanding. On the contrary. Seeing seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. By ambiguity, Heidegger refers to the aspect of our everydayness that makes us unable to distinguish between genuine and ungentine understanding. Our inauthentic being also influences the way we relate to another person. We objectify him and take from him his own possibility for being.

Recollecting the possibilities of being is necessary in order to recollect the being of Being. Only when I understand that I have lost this basic connection, my openness, when I have existed in an inauthentic manner, am I able to strive for authenticity, openness, and the bodily experience of this. Heidegger later uses the term "einkehren", which can be interpreted as a homecoming, a return to something original.³⁹ As a bodily experience, such a return is to re-experience being one with all that is. It is homecoming in the sense that man is innately part of this connection, even though in experience it may have been lost. Heidegger's recollection refers to what has been forgotten, what has passed into oblivion ("Seinsvergessenheit")⁴⁰. It also refers to what is closed and at the same time, open in its fundamental being. If man's existence is, in Heidegger's terms being as light ("Licht"), it is no wonder that he speaks of covers and darkening⁴¹. What passes into oblivion is our original bodily experience of connectedness to being. The world darkens because people have lost their connection to what is the most original in them. Going back to the beginning is not regression but a search for a lost connection. In terms of our bodily experience, that we have forgotten our connection to being signifies that our transpersonal experience as a bodily horizon of experience is closed off. At any rate, the openness or closedness of our bodily horizons of experience depends on our own efforts. Through exercise, we can scrutinize them.

Under the pressure of our traditions, our ego-logical, everyday body has lost many of its experiential levels. Adapting to the body of "das Man", it had to accept certain modes of bodily experience and reject others. Movement, however, is the key to these corporeal gates. Movement can be the path to the gateless gate, which in the end is most difficult to open. The gateless gate - a zen metaphor - refers here to the bodily experience where a person engaged in movement finally encounters the transcendent and experiences his relation to being.

Heidegger describes this encounter as the untrembling heart of silence and light of openness⁴². Heidegger's lyrical description of the experience of the place of silence is not a metaphor. It is a bodily experience, the goal of recollection.

At this point, I would like to ask how the dancer moves within the levels of experience described above. Is there a form of art dance, or an approach to performance, with the goal, as in sacred dance, of what I have called transpersonal experience?

The primary intention of such dance is not expression, but rather the deepening of the dancer's own experience of himself and his relationship to the world. In its expression it strives to convey this experience to the audience. This kind of dance could be considered both a project of self and expression.

It also might be worth asking how the element of play fits into dance. On the other hand,

we could ask if there is a dance form that is liable to constrain the dancer to what I call, using Levin's term, the ego-logical body. In such cases, of course the dancer's experience is defined by others. Could an authority, a single choreographer or a tradition be the "other" in this situation? Is the pelvic immobility of a classic ballet dancer an expression of the denial of the sexuality connected to bodiliness?

In the above, I have brought forward several dimensions of the human experience, the majority of which are related to our existence in the world as moving bodies. Knowingly or unknowingly, the dancer approaches many of these experiences in movement. In a way, these experiences are much like rooms that the dancer must pass through during his life. In my opinion, the essential feature is how carefully the dancer examines each room when he is in it; does he notice the form, style and period of the furniture, the color of the wallpaper, and the placement of the windows and the exits. Exits are of special importance. Only by seeking out exits can the dancer ensure that he at least finds all the rooms in the house where he moves.

In dance the dancer analyzes himself. To attempt expression, he must scrutinize his own body experience on one hand and, on the other, the mental-spiritual experiences he wants to express in his dance. Examining his horizons of experience, he enlarges and unfolds them. He analyzes, in a very concrete way, the relationship between the mental and the physical, the relationship that in philosophy is often regarded as unsoluble. The dancer must resolve this issue in his own experience when he translates his mental spiritual experience into the language of movement. For the dancer, the body is revealed as a sensitive instrument, able to express the most delicate nuances of experience. In dance, movements may also create an experience where the mental-spiritual and bodily horizons of experience meld together, an experience of the corporeality of spirituality and the spirituality of corporeality. This experience is the birth experience of all dance, where the spirit turns to flesh and the flesh to spirit.

Notes:

1. Valery 1983, p. 55.
2. Valery 1983, p. 55.
3. Heidegger 1986, p. 145.
4. "Le corps est le véhicule de l'être au monde, et avoir un corps c'est pour un vivant se joindre à un milieu défini, se confondre avec certains projets et s'y engager continuellement." Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 97.
5. "(...) vers lequel tous les objets tournent leur face..." Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 97.
6. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 97.

7. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 16.
8. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 236.
9. "un sujet naturel", Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 231
10. "un moi naturel", Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 239.
11. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 239.
12. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 108.
13. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 85.
14. "mouvement et conscience de mouvement", Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 129.
15. "La conscience est originairement non pas un 'je pense que', mais un 'je peux'." Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 160.
16. Cohen 1983, p. 20.
17. "champ de présence", Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 475.
18. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 485.
19. Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 163.
20. "(...) elle le nourrit secrément et y emploie une part de ses forces..." Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 101.
21. When I speak of injury as "traces" I am not using the term in the same sense that Emmanuel Levinas uses it.
22. Sartre 1988, p. 374.
23. Scheler 1980a, p. 39.
24. Scheler 1980b, p. 56.
25. "(...) la conscience du corps envahit le corps, l'âme se répand sur toutes ses parties, ..." Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 90.
26. "Il va falloir de la même manière réveiller l'expérience du monde tel qu'il nous apparaît en tant nous sommes au monde par notre corps, en tant que nous percevons le monde avec notre corps." Merleau-Ponty 1987, p. 239.
27. Levin 1985, 1988.
28. Levin 1985, p. 100.

29. Levin 1985, p. 101.
30. Levin 1988, p. 204.
31. Levin 1988, p. 47.
32. Levin 1988, p. 47.
33. See e.g. Falk 1988a and 1988b; Eichberg 1987.
34. Levin 1988, p. 47.
35. Levin sees such level.
36. Heidegger 1986, p. 173.
37. Levin 1988, p. 272.
38. Heidegger 1986, p. 385.
39. Heidegger 1988a, p. 46.
40. Heidegger 1987, p. 19.
41. "die Verdüsterung der Welt", Heidegger 1987, p. 29.
42. Heidegger 1988b, p. 75.

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